摘要
为研究下游企业间存在Bertrand价格竞争时的供应链信息纵向共享激励及其对供应链整体绩效的影响,利用总体均值后验统计推断,建立了由1个上游供应商和n(≥2)个具有私有需求信息的下游制造商构成的两级供应链信息博弈模型.结果表明,虽然信息共享能提高供应链的整体绩效,但隐藏信息却是下游企业的最优策略.进一步研究发现,上下游企业间的信息交易对供应链各方都是有利的,并且通过信息租金的转移支付,信息完全共享的帕累托最优均衡是可以实现的.
This paper investigated the incentives for firms to share information vertically in a two-level supply chain in which there are an upstream firm （a supplier） and many downstream firms （manufacturers） which have private information about stochastic demand. The results show that although the supply chain can benefit from information sharing , no information sharing is the optimal strategy for the downstream firms. However, further research shows that information trade between the upstream firm and all of the downstream firms in the supply chain will benefit all parties in the supply chain , so complete information sharing i.e. the optimal Pareto equilibrium can be achieved through this kind of trade.
出处
《上海交通大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2008年第9期1494-1500,共7页
Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772065)
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70732003)
