摘要
通过构建监管机构、寿险经营机构及其负责人参与的博弈模型,求解均衡状态下寿险经营机构及其负责人进行违规操作,保监会进行监督检查的均衡概率,提出了未来寿险投资监管思路调整的建议。
This their principals, paper establishes a model which involves the regulatory authorities, life insurance companies and Through game analysis, this paper achieved the probability for the corporation and their principals to violate the supervision policy, and the probability for the authority to check up. Finally, it puts forward several proposals to meliorate the investment supervision condition.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
2008年第10期53-55,60,共4页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70701026)
关键词
寿险
投资监管
博弈均衡
监管政策
稽查概率
life insurance
investment supervision
game equilibrium
regulatory policy
check probability
