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代理理论、经理层行为与管理会计研究——基于代理理论的管理会计研究综述 被引量:21

Agency Theory,Manager Behavior And Managerial Accounting Research——A Literature Review of Managerial Accounting Research Based on Agency Theory
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摘要 本文系统梳理了基于代理理论的管理会计研究经典文献及最新研究成果,这其中既包括代理理论对管理会计总体框架的影响,又包括其对管理会计体系中的预算管理、成本计算与管理、管理控制系统、业绩评价与激励等子系统的影响。作者认为,代理理论与管理会计研究的相互交融巩固了管理会计的经济学理论基础,转换了管理会计的研究视角,增进了管理会计的科学性及研究深度,进而指出未来研究中探讨代理理论各分支相互融合对管理会计的影响,以及关注模型的细节有效性方面,结合实地研究、心理学和行为学的研究成果将是该领域深化研究的重要方向。 Institutional economics research findings on corporation nature greatly enrich the managerial accounting researches and urge their thoughts transfer from traditional technology viewpoint to contractual one.This paper introduces classical papers and the foreland researches in managerial accounting researches based on agency theory systematically,which consist of its influence on the managerial accounting framework,budget management,cost calculation and management,managerial monitoring,performance evaluation and motivation,etc.Authors believe the cross researches of agency theory and managerial accounting solidify the economic theory foundation of managerial accounting;diverse its research views scientifically and profoundly.Then authors point out the trend in managerial accounting future researches will be wider and deeper,on which agency sub-theories across studies,the details of agency model and the combined fruits with field study,psychology and behavior research.
作者 毛洪涛 王新
出处 《会计研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第9期47-54,共8页 Accounting Research
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