摘要
国家形成理论致力于重现公民权和民主化的军事基础,认为公民权应被理解为国家与社会之间就战争物资进行"谈判"的副产品。作者在对春秋战国国际体系及近代早期欧洲体系中的国家形成过程进行比较研究后认为,如果公民权源于国际竞争,那么在春秋战国时期的国际体系中,统治者也曾为了鼓动民众参战和为国牺牲而做出了三项让步:言论自由、司法公正和经济福利。作者提出一个世界政治的动态理论,认为国家形成过程中的制衡逻辑是公民权跨越时空分别在春秋战国时期和近代早期欧洲兴起的主要因素。公民权在春秋战国时期没落的根本原因是严重低估了制衡逻辑的对手,即支配逻辑;而公民权得以在西方演变为民主制度的关键因素在于支配逻辑的相对弱势。
Theories of state formation have sought to restore the military basis of citizenship and democracy, arguing that citizenship rights should be understood as the by-products of state-society bargaining over the means of war. The author compares the processes of state formation between the ancient Chinese and early modern European systems, and set up a theoretical framework of 'dynamics of competing logics' to explain both the Chinese and European trajectories. He argues that the 'logic of balancing' explains why citizenship rights emerged in both ancient China and early modern Europe despite vast differences in time and space. Citizenship rights eventually disappeared in ancient China because the 'logic of balancing' was overwhelmed by its opposite, the 'logic of domination.' In comparison, the reason why citizenship rights made the transition to democracy in modern Europe is because the 'logic of domination' was relatively weak.
出处
《世界经济与政治》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第9期6-20,共15页
World Economics and Politics
