摘要
在财政支农和正规放贷额度已存在较大制约的情况下,商业性金融在农村的发展至关重要。本文对农村金融信贷关系博弈的研究表明,在信贷交易成本和贷款利率降低的情况下,金融机构和农户的无限次重复博弈可以实现信贷博弈的长期均衡,而这需要以较高的规模效益水平为前提;声誉制约机制可以最大限度地降低农村金融中的信息不对称问题,从而能够部分克服双方信用关系中的"囚徒困境"难题。农业生产的不确定性决定了政策性金融和财政补贴的重要性,商业性金融和政策性金融需要区分对待。
Since the fiscal support and bank lending have been facing many constraints, it＇s crucial to develop commercial financing in rural areas. This paper carries out a game analysis of farm credit, our results show that the long-term equilibrium of game between financial institutes and farmers could be achieved in the case of credit transaction costs and lending rates are reduced, which needs a higher level of economies of scale as the prerequisite. Reputation-restraint mechanisms can maximize the reduction of impact of asymmetric information in farm credit, thus able to partly overcome the ＂Prisoner＇s Dilemma＂ problem of credit relations between financial institutes and farms. Policy-oriented financing and fiscal subsidies are important because of the uncertainty of agriculture production, thereby the commercial financing and policy-oriented financing should be treated differently.
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第7期37-43,共7页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
关键词
农村信贷
重复博弈
完美贝叶斯均衡
Farm credit Repeated came Perfect bayesian equilibrium
