摘要
加入WTO后,中国减少对进口征收关税和壁垒,大豆产业将面临进口大豆的冲击。大豆的比较优势较弱,进口贸易依存度逐年增长。建立博弈模型来分析政府对我国大豆产业补贴的策略选择,通过分析发现,中国政府的补贴对中国大豆产量起了促进作用,而对美国大豆产量起到了抑制的作用。而且当美国大豆生产商选择高价格策略时,中国政府选择补贴国内高技术大豆生产商;当美国大豆生产商选择低价格时,中国政府选择补贴普通豆农。
After entering into WTO, the industry of soybean has been challenged because Chinese government decreases the tax and rampart of the import. In addition, the comparative advantage decreases year by year, but the degree of independence on import trade increases. This article analyzes the soybean producers from China and America based on the Game Theory. It is concluded that the compensation does not only serve as a catalyst to the quantity of national soybean production, but also inhibit to that of America. In addition, the best strategy for Chinese government is to compensate the high-technology soybean producers if American producers improve price, When American producers decrease price, Chinese government should compensate the common soybean producers.
出处
《价值工程》
2008年第8期50-53,共4页
Value Engineering
关键词
大豆产业
政府补贴
博弈模型
industry of soybean
compensation by goverment
Game Theory
