摘要
经理人股权薪酬合约中限制性股票和股票期权如何配置与其激励特性及经理人股票期权价值相关。本文使用布莱克——斯科尔斯模型衡量经理人期杈价值时存在没有考虑经理人异质风险态度、风险构成对期权定价的影响。介绍了3个不同模型支撑下的股权薪酬合约结构的理论,并联系我国的实际情况提出了对我国上市公司制定股权薪酬合约计划的启示和建议。
It is related to the incentive character and the executive＇s Stock Option Value for how to collocate the restricted stock and the stock option in the executive＇s equity compensation contract. When we apply the Black Scholes model to measure the executive＇s Stock Option Value, it doesn＇t consider the executive＇s different risk attitude and the structure of risk. This paper introduces three models which lead to the theory of the structure of equity compensation contract, last, this paper gives some inspiration and advices for Chinese listed companies to frame equity compensation contract on the basis of practical circs.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第14期17-21,共5页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
关键词
股权薪酬合约
经理人期权价值
布莱克一斯科尔斯模型
equity compensation contract
the executive＇s stock option value
the Black-Scholes model
