摘要
本文引入了成本收益分析和博弈分析工具,对银行监管协调与合作的成本和收益进行比较,对银行监管不同主体的协调与合作意愿进行分析。通过分析,寻求监管主体协调与合作的均衡点和中国银行监管当局政策的着力点。笔者认为,各监管主体为了争取监管协调主动权,扩大影响力,都存在加大协调力度的倾向。在银监会与国外监管当局的博弈分析中,笔者引入合作溢价概念,并就两国监管当局在完全信息下的博弈情况进行分析,得出若干不同的结论。最后,笔者根据分析结论,提出优化监管协调与合作的相关政策建议。
In this paper, the author introduces cost-revenue and game analysis, compares the cost to the revenue of the coordination and cooperation in banking regulation, and then analyzes the willingness of different subjects in banking regulation. Through analysis, the author wants to seek for the balance point of different subjects in coordination and cooperation, and for the focus of regulation authority＇ s policies in China. The author believes that each subject inclines to intensify efforts for coordination to gain initiative and expand influence in supervision and regulation. In the analysis of the game between China＇ s Banking Regulatory Commission and foreigu regulatory authorities, the author employs the concept of cooperation premium and reaches several conclusions about their game situation under complete information circumstances. Finally, some policy suggestions to improve coordination and cooperation in banking supervision and regulation are proposed.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第7期145-153,共9页
Journal of Financial Research
关键词
银行业监管
成本收益分析
博弈分析
banking supervision and regulation
cost-revenue analysis
Game analysis
