摘要
本文研究延迟公布年报的上市公司是否存在着盈余管理的行为。在实证过程中,采用了前瞻性修正的琼斯模型来估计操纵性应计部分.本文的实证结论认为:延迟公布年报的行为与负的实际盈余相关.同时,由于担心市场会对延迟公布年报的行为予以惩罚,延迟公布年报的公司会考虑到在当期运用调低利润的措施来进行盈余管理,从而使得下一期利润能够大幅度上升。另外,本文也发现公司调低利润的幅度与年报延迟公布的时间呈现出正相关的关系。
We assess whether listed companies which postpone annual report engage in earnings man- agement. The forward-looking modified Jones model is used in figuring out the discretionary accruals. Our results provide evidence consistent with that delayed annual report is related to negative earnings surprises. Meanwhile, such action would be penalized by the capital market. As a result, late reporters appear to manage earnings by means of decreasing current income and increasing future income. Furthermore, we find the magnitude of income-declining accruals is positively correlated with reporting lag.
出处
《数理统计与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第4期635-642,共8页
Journal of Applied Statistics and Management
关键词
年报公布时间
盈余管理
前瞻性修正的琼斯模型
利润冲销
annual report-announcement timing, earnings management, forward-looking modified Jones model, big bath
