摘要
在《权利、合作与福利的经济学》一书中,萨格登运用现代博弈论的分析工具,缜密地展示一些具体的社会惯例是如何在人们的相互交往中自发形成和演化变迁的。其中的一些理论发现,以及所映射的一些社会问题,对经济学、伦理学、政治哲学、法学、社会学乃至人类学的研究,都具有一定的理论意义。通观全书可以发现,萨格登对作为一种自发社会秩序的"惯例"的博弈论分析,是非常深刻和到位的,但是,萨格登的理论分析还不能完全解释伦理学中的"休谟法则"。这即是说,从人们在重复社会博弈中的利益最大化策略选择的分析思路,并不能证明为什么人类有遵守社会博弈规则这种先天"共同的道德直觉"。人类的共同的道德直觉可能是惯例的"因",而不是惯例的"果"。
By employing some analytical tools of modern game theory, Professor Robert Sugden gives very clear explanations of the spontaneous formation and evolution of social convention in human interaction in his book The Economics of Rights Cooperation and Welfare. Some of his theoretical findings and their implications have great significance for economics, ethics, political sciences, legal theory, sociology and anthropology and other social sciences. Although Sugden＇s game theoretical analysis of social conventions which he regarded as some spontaneous social orders, his theories seemingly still cannot offer some convincing explanation of ＂the Hume Law＂. It is that he seemingly cannot prove the fact that why human commonly have the priori moral intuition to obey the rule of social game in his exposition of the repeated game with maximization of players＇ self-interest. Therefore, we guess that the human＇s common moral sentiment may be the ＂cause＂ of social conventions but not their ＂result＂.
出处
《学术月刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第6期90-97,共8页
Academic Monthly
关键词
社会博弈
自发秩序
道德情感
产权惯例
social game, spontaneous order, moral sentiment, convention of property
