摘要
借助于摩根士丹利"以颇为可观的价格"收购珠海南通银行全部股权,绕过银监会的五年管制期限而提前获取中国内地全系列商业银行经营牌照的案例,本文提出一种不同于发达市场经济体系中目标企业收购溢价来源的新解释,即转型期中国受管制行业内目标企业所获得的收购溢价正是部分地来源于监管机构对该行业施加的进入管制。同时,本文也为理解转型经济体系内重要行业中的进入管制的长期存在及其消解提供了新视角。
This paper provided an original explanation for why the targets in regulated industries were often overpaid in merger and acquisition activities. On the one hand, the regulation of entry made the targets valuable as qualified players. On the other hand, the regulation of entry also made the existed players inefficient. The paper also declared that there to be some close relation between the regulation of entry and the market structure of regulated industries, and advanced some new viewpoints in lessening the comprehensive regulations in transition economies as well.
出处
《浙江社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第6期15-24,共10页
Zhejiang Social Sciences
关键词
收购溢价
进入管制
市场结构
Overpaid target, The regulation of entry , Market structure
