摘要
我国的审计制度是单纯的政策行为,缺乏一个充分的博弈过程。其实,不仅构成审计关系的审计者、被审计者和审计委托人三方,两两构成博弈关系,其中还涉及其他利益方的博弈。审计制度的安排,应该是这些相关利益集团多次博弈的结果,因为只有这样才能使审计制度成为博弈方自愿执行的、有约束力的社会契约。
China＇s auditory system is purely acts of policies, lacking a competitive process. In fact, the auditor, auditee and auditory entruster constitute gaming relations. Gaming also relates to other parties interested. Any arrangement of auditory systems must be the result of many rounds o f gaming of these parties concerned. Only in this way can the auditory system become a binding social contract that they are willing to execute.
出处
《新疆大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2008年第3期33-37,共5页
Journal of Xinjiang University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
基金
山东省教育厅基金资助项目"上市公司在信息时代下的审计方法与策略研究"(S07YB02)
山东省审计厅2007-2010年重点项目和济南大学博士基金的阶段成果
关键词
审计基础关系
审计制度
博弈分析
basic auditory relations
auditory system
gaming analysis
