摘要
本文通过构建理论模型分析了金字塔结构下最终控制性股东的盘踞效应与利益协同效应。本文发现最终控制权与所有权的分离度并非总是诱发最终控制性股东对小股东的利益侵害,而最终控制权在不同区间所体现的控制能力以及最终控制性股东对控股成本与收益的权衡是影响与小股东之间代理关系的主要因素,两者结合更好地解释了最终控制性股东的控股动机。本文通过经验分析验证了理论分析结论。
This paper present a theoretical model to disentangle the entrenchment and incentive effects with the ultimate controlling shareholders in pyramidal ownership. The finding of the paper is that the divergence of the voting rights and cash flow rights in pyramidal ownership is not the only incentive to the expropriation of minority shareholders, while both the voting right at different levels and the trade - off of costs and benefits of ultimate controlling shareholder have more impact on the agency relationship with the minority shareholders, which gives more fully explanations of the controlling motives of ultimate shareholders. This paper empirically examined the theoretical analysis conclusions.
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第5期91-101,共11页
China Soft Science
基金
教育部人文社科规划项目(06JA630005)
北京交通大学"十一五"科研重大基金项目(2005SE007)
关键词
金字塔结构
最终控制性股东
盘踞效应
利益协同效应
pyramidal ownership
ultimate controlling shareholder
entrenchment effect
convergence interest effect
