摘要
对国有企业进行股份制改造并上市发行股票是我国改造国有大中型企业的重要途径,我们将国有企业股份制改造分为四种模式,并考察了改制模式、控股股东控制上市公司程度及其经济后果的关系。通过分析1997-2000年我国285个国有企业首次公开发行后三年的数据,我们发现改制模式的不同深刻地影响控股股东对控制程度的选择,非完整改造公司的控股股东选择控制程度高的模式的概率较高。另外,我们还发现控股股东对于上市公司控制程度越高,控股股东占用上市公司资金及与上市公司关联交易的程度越严重,但是,很大程度上,控制程度对于资金占用与关联交易的影响来自于改制模式的不同,也就是改制模式不同深刻地影响上市公司的治理结构,并进而影响了关联交易程度和控股股东对于上市公司利益的侵占。本文的研究结论所蕴含的启示是,很大程度上,控股股东控制上市公司的动机来源于上市前国有企业的不彻底改造,并且这种不彻底的改造方式已经对公司治理效率产生严重的不良影响。
Shareholding reform and IPO is chosen to reconstruct Chinese State-owned Enterprises （SOEs）. We classify the restructuring modes into 4 types and analyze the relationship of restructuring modes, the power of controlling shareholders and its economic effects. Using a sample of 285 SOEs that went public between 1997 and 2000, we find that restructuring mode affects the controlling degree. The controlling shareholders of SOEs that went through an incomplete reorganization have a stronger controlling incentive and their probability to choose high-degree controlling mode is higher. Meanwhile, a higher controlling degree will result in a more severe fund embezzlement and related transaction of the listed company. And to a great extent, the effect of controlling degree on fund embezzlement and related transaction is due to different restructuring mode, that is, restructuring mode can have a great influence on corporate governance structure and thus, affect related transaction and exploitation. What implies in this paper is, to a large degree, the incomplete restructuring results in controlling shareholder＇s incentive to exploit minority shareholder of the listed company and has created negative influence on the efficiency of corporate governance.
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
2008年第2期4-14,共11页
Nankai Business Review
基金
教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”项目(教技司[2005]2号)资助
关键词
国有企业
股份制改造
控制
State-owned Enterprises （SOEs）
Shareholding Reform
Control
