摘要
比较我国内部控制体系同国外先进水平的差距可知,企业风险管理(ERM)方面相关规范及措施的滞后已经给很多企业带来了巨大的损失和危机,从而丧失投资者的信任.分析管理者和投资者在建立有效的ERM机制上的效用后,可以发现投资者和管理者之间的博弈是一种非合作博弈,必须通过政府的相关规范改变博弈双方的效用,促使企业建设ERM,才能有效地避免由于风险而使企业陷入困境,从而保护投资者的利益.最后对如何建立以ERM为核心的内部控制体系提出了几点建议以供借鉴.
A comparative study of control systems at home and abroad shows that the backward enterprise risk management （ERM） rules and methods cause huge losses and major crisis in many enterprises, which results in the trust-losing of investors. An analysis of the roles of investors and managers on establishing an ERM system shows that the game between investors and managers is an uncooperative one. Cooperation can be established with the government＇s participation into the game to change the roles of the participants and to help enterprises to establish an ERM system to minimize the potential influence of risks for the sake of investors＇ interests. Finally, the paper recommends establishing an ERM-Cored internal control system.
出处
《同济大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2008年第3期418-423,共6页
Journal of Tongji University:Natural Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70672083)
关键词
内部控制
企业风险管理
效用
博弈论
政府参与
internal control
enterprise risk management
utility
game theory
government participation
