摘要
基于信息不对称假设的现行金融中介理论忽视了信息分享的重要性,提出了关系型融资模型。表明在一定的成本约束下,银行间有激励进行关于各自关系型客户信息的分享。银行关系型客户的比例越高,其信息分享的规模经济效应越明显,但由于信息分享降低了从垄断信息获取"信息租金"的比较优势,银行进行信息分享的激励会越来越弱。
Existing theories of financial intermediation based on the assumption of informational asymmetry have overlooked the importance of information sharing. The paper provides a model concerning relationship financing which shows that a bank has incentive to share its own relationship-style customers＇ information with other banks under certain cost restriction. A bank has bigger effect of scale economy, but weaker incentive to share information due to the reduction of its comparative advantages in the aspect of acquiring information rents from the monopolistic information if it has a bigger proportion of relationshipstyle customers in a certain region than other banks before information sharing.
出处
《系统管理学报》
北大核心
2008年第1期21-24,共4页
Journal of Systems & Management
关键词
关系型融资
信息不对称
信息分享
激励机制
relationship financing
informational asymmetry
information sharing
incentive mechanism
