摘要
作为国家进行公共财政管理、提高财政透明度的有力手段,政府会计已经日益受到政府和相关人士的重视,但人们的注意似乎都集中在如何建立完善的政府会计体系上,对于"为什么要建立政府会计体系"这一基本的理论却研究很少。本文就以博弈论为理论出发点,建立了政府与纳税人之间的逆向选择模型,讨论了政府和纳税人之间在信息不对称情况下将出现的逆向选择问题,针对这一问题提出两个解决方法——信号传递和信号甄别,结合这两种方法,得出"无论是政府还是纳税人,都对建立完善的政府会计体系有更高的要求"的结论,于是,政府会计才会应运而生。本文试图从博弈论的角度论证政府会计之所以存在的依据。
As a powerful method in public finance management, the governmental accounting can improve the fiscal transparency and it has received attention from governments and people. But many people has paid more attention to how to build the governmental accounting, nor to the basic theme such as ＂why it must be built ＂. Based on the Game Theory, this article constructs the adverse selection mode, debates the adverse selection in condition of asymmetric information, then raises two resolutions——signaling and screening. Using these, it conclusions that either the governments or the tax - payers want the higher degree governmental accounting. So the governmental accounting is built. All in a word, this articles proves why the governmental accounting exists.
出处
《财经问题研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第2期76-81,共6页
Research On Financial and Economic Issues
关键词
政府会计
逆向选择模型
信号传递
信号甄别
governmental accounting
adverse selection mode
signaling
screening
