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公众投资者利益与机构投资者委托代理问题研究 被引量:1

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摘要 伴随着投资主体机构化态势的演进,越来越多的机构投资者成为上市公司的大股东,代理公众投资者参与公司治理。但是否像传统的公司治理理论所强调的,公众投资者的"劣势"地位以及市场效率会因此得到改善呢?针对此,本文系统分析了公众投资者和机构投资者之间的委托代理结构以及由此引发的投资者道德风险行为,对机构投资者在保护公众投资者利益,改善市场效率方面的作用提出了质疑。
作者 李鹏 蔡庆丰
机构地区 厦门大学
出处 《武汉金融》 北大核心 2008年第2期15-17,共3页 Wuhan Finance
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参考文献7

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