摘要
本文在新古典投资理论的框架下引入中国转轨时期的制度性因素，建立包括私有部门、国企部门以及政府部门的投资行为模型，论证了国有企业多重目标而导致其过度投资和资本积累，同时解释了在转轨过程中出现的诸如“国退民进”等演化现象，论证了政府倾向于干预经济，施行“逆风向行事”规则，然而因其对项目真实利润的不可准确估测性会导致投资的过度波动，从而表明政府投资可能是经济中投资波动的来源。
This paper introduces the institutional factors in China＇s transitional period into the framework of neoclassical investment theories and builds up a model involving private enterprises, SOEs and the government sector as the three main investment parties. We show that during China＇s transition SOEs＇ excessive investment and capital accumulation are results of their not taking profit-maximization as their business goal. We also explain other phenomena in the transitional process such as SOE privatization and the emergence of private enterprises. In the meantime, we find that government investment is a possible source for investment fluctuation because it does not follow the true return of capital.
出处
《经济学（季刊）》
2007年第1期93-110,共18页
China Economic Quarterly
