摘要
结合信息不对称条件下的契约设计和存在双边道德风险的激励问题,考虑在风险投资者和创业者之间的最优契约关系中,政府的公共补贴对风险投资者和创业者之间的收益关系的影响。发现在风险投资者和创业者之间存在着一种"财富传递效应",即政府对风险投资者投资损失的补贴可以增加创业者的期望收益,因此这种补贴政策可以激励更多的科技人才和管理人才投入到创业活动中来。在没有政府公共补贴时,一些因投资价值相对较小而无法获得风险资本投资的项目,在有政府公共补贴后能够获得风险资本的投资,即政府的公共补贴不仅能增加风险资本的供给,也能增加创业企业对风险资本的需求。
How government subsidies influence venture capitalists and entrepreneurial teams were studied when there is optimal financial contract between them. It is concluded that there is wealth transmission effect between venture capitalists and entrepreneurial teams, namely, that Government provides public subsidies to venture Capitalists can increase entrepreneur＇s expect earnings. This kind of subsidies policy can encourage more technologists and managers enter into enterprise. Some low valued projects which can not obtain venture Capitals can also gain some venture Capitals. Public sub- sidies can not only raise the supply of venture Capitals but also extend their demand.
出处
《管理学报》
2007年第6期833-838,共6页
Chinese Journal of Management
关键词
政府补贴
契约关系
财富传递效应
government subsidies
contracting
wealth transmission effect
