摘要
我国经济增长方式属于政府主导的速度性经济,在经济快速增长中,地方政府行为起了非常重要的作用。由于地方政府效用函数的最优解与中央政府效用函数的最优解不一致,地方政府行为越来越接近企业行业,越来越以追求地方政府收入最大化为首要目标,而且GDP增长率增加地方官员获得晋升机会,这种"晋升激励"成为地方政府经济扩张的重要原因。而地方政府在制度、知识和劳力等经济发展的其它资源的可得性受到制约的条件下,促使金融资源的投入增加是实现GDP快速增长的捷径,从而使得投资过渡膨胀,加速了通货膨胀。
China＇s economic growth pattern is basically the speed economy dominated by the local governments. The local governments tend to seek the local maximum revenue as their primary goal and GDP growth rate will enhance the possibility of getting promoted. These two reasons force the local governments to get more financial investment poured to attain high GDP growth rate, as they are constrained by the accessibility of the resources, such as institutions, knowledge and labor force, that allow for economic developments. This style of high GDP growth rate engenders excess investment and deteriorates inflation.
出处
《新疆大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
2007年第5期30-35,共6页
Journal of Xinjiang University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
关键词
地方政府行为
通货膨胀
影响
local government behavior
inflation impact
