摘要
针对当前排污监察的现状,提出了环境监察部门聘用环境监察员与排污单位之间的监察与反监察博弈观点.就监察员不同的收入结构,分别建立了监察排污静态博弈模型和查处排污动态博弈模型,探讨了监察员固定收入结构与罚款提成收入结构对那什均衡的影响,得出了监察员与排污单位的期望得益.通过分析有关参数,提出了排污监察中信息不对称问题的解决方法,探求了环境监察部门的策略选择.
Information asymmetry exists in question, This paper studis on the relationship pollution supervision. In order to solve this between the office, inspector and polluter with the theory of Stochastic optimization, Contract, Information and Game. We demonstrate that the main reason for pollution inspectors don＇t doing the best is the institution. We think that the relationship between pollution office and inspectors is the principal-agent, and establish a contract of sharing inspirit-risk for pollution supervision.
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
CSCD
北大核心
2007年第15期29-34,共6页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
国家自然科学基金(50309003)
国家自然科学基金(70673034)
关键词
排污监察
收入结构
那什均衡
混合策略
pollution supervision
nash equilibrium
game
mixed strategy
