摘要
Perspectivalism has been widely interpreted as the doctrine that the truth-value of any proposition is decided by a relevant observer, and there is no truth beyond one’s perspective. Perspectivalism so construed has been quite prosperous in contemporary Western philosophy. According to Searle’s understanding, Heidegger is another perspectivalist in the sense that his phenomenological methodology does exclude the validity of the physical reality from the Dasein’s perspective. However, this is exactly the point where Searle cannot agree with Heidegger, because Heidegger’s perspectivalist framework will inevitably frustrate any attempt to formulate the basic concern of Anglo-American philosophy of mind, viz. How to combine the perspective of a particular person inside the world with an objective or scientific view of that same world?
Perspectivalism has been widely interpreted as the doctrine that the truth-value of any proposition is decided by a relevant observer, and there is no truth beyond one’s perspective. Perspectivalism so construed has been quite prosperous in contemporary Western philosophy. According to Searle’s understanding, Heidegger is another perspectivalist in the sense that his phenomenological methodology does exclude the validity of the physical reality from the Dasein’s perspective. However, this is exactly the point where Searle cannot agree with Heidegger, because Heidegger’s perspectivalist framework will inevitably frustrate any attempt to formulate the basic concern of Anglo-American philosophy of mind, viz. How to combine the perspective of a particular person inside the world with an objective or scientific view of that same world?
出处
《哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第5期53-58,共6页
Philosophical Research
基金
复旦大学"985工程"哲学社会科学创新基地2005年度研究项目"杜威哲学的当代意义"(编号05FCZD0012)的资助。
