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民营上市公司大股东机制的公司治理效应实证分析——考虑各种主体治理机制的相关性 被引量:26

An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Governance Mechanism of Major Shareholder of Private Listed Companies
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摘要 本文通过研究以股东、董事会、债权人、经营者为参与人的各种治理机制之间的关系,分析了大股东治理机制与其他治理机制的相关性。选择能代表各种治理机制的变量,并以大股东治理机制变量为初始变量,其他治理机制变量为中间变量,公司绩效指标为最终变量,采用通径分析法对大股东的公司治理效应及其机制进行实证分析。结果说明,一方面,尽管大股东治理在民营上市公司中有其存在的合理性,但它确实表现出负的公司治理效应;另一方面,虽然有少数其他治理机制能与大股东机制发生相互作用关系,但并没有对大股东形成有效制约。因此,必须完善其他能有效地制约大股东负面作用的公司治理机制,使得各种公司治理机制得到协调发展。 By analyzing the relationship between different governance mechanisms, the paper mainly studies the correlation between the governance mechanism of major stockholders and other mechanism. By selecting variables of corporate governance mechanisms, arid taking the governance mechanism of major stockholder as original variable, other corporate governance mechanisms as medium variables, and corporate performance as ultimate variable, the governance mechanism of major stockholder and its effects on the corporate governance is demonstrated through path method, The study shows though the governance mechanism of major stockholder have its existent rationality, it expresses really the negative corporate governance effects, while other corporate governance mechanisms also take less significance in lessening this negative effects. So it is suggested that all corporate governance mechanisms must be perfected.
出处 《金融研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2007年第02A期133-145,共13页 Journal of Financial Research
关键词 大股东治理机制 民营上市公司 公司治理效应 通径分析 the governance mechanism of major stockholder private listed companies in China the effects on corporate governance path method
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