摘要
征收环境污染税是为治理环境污染而筹集资金,利用税收杠杆来促进生态环境的良性循环。通过构建企业进入博弈模型和政府税率与企业产量博弈的完全信息动态博弈模型,导出政府、企业双方局中人在开征环境污染税后所达到的子博弈完美纳什均衡,可分析我国开征环境污染税的可行性以及所能达到的效果,从而为环境污染税的开征提供理论依据。
The purpose of collecting environmental pollution tax is to raise the fund, and then utilize the tax revenue lever to protect our environment. By constructing a dynamic game model of enterprise entry and a complete information dynamic game model of tax rate and enterprise＇s output, this paper deduces the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium among government and enterprise after collecting the environmental pollution tax, and analyzes the feasibility and results of the tax, thus offer the theoretical foundation for collecting environmental pollution tax.
出处
《江苏科技大学学报（社会科学版）》
2007年第1期15-17,共3页
Journal of Jiangsu University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)
关键词
环境
污染税
博弈
environment
pollution tax
game
