摘要
本文探讨了控制权转让市场中收购方终极所有权、层级与信息泄露之间的关系。研究发现收购方的终极所有权属性与信息泄露严重程度有着显著的相关关系。当收购人为民营企业时,非公开收购信息进入股价的速度要明显的慢于国有企业收购人;当地方国有企业为收购人时,其非公开收购信息进入股价的速度又明显的快于其他两类企业。表明民营企业维护收购信息的机密性的动机最强,而地方国有企业收购信息则最容易被市场察觉。与预期不一致的是,公司的层级结构与信息泄露速度没有显著的关系,这一发现意味着收购等重大事件的决策权集中在控制链最上层控制人手中,下层企业只是执行这些决策的工具。
In this article, we have probed into the relations, on the markets of control right transfer, between the mergers' ultimate ownership, corporate tiers and information disclosure and found that the attributes of purchasers' ultimate ownership are obviously related to the seriousness of information revelation. When the bidder is a private enterprise, the speed at which the information about closed purchases gets involved in share prices is obviously lower than when the bidder is a center-government-owned enterprise; when the bidder is a local-government-owned enterprise, the said speed is obviously greater when the bidder is a private or government-owned enterprise. When the bidder is a private enterprise, the strongest is the motive for safeguarding the secrecy about the information on bidding, but when the bidder is a local-government-owned enterprise, the information on bidding is most easily elicited. What is beyond our expectation is that we have discovered that the corporate structure of tiers is not noticeably related to information disclosure, and this finding implies that the right to make major decisions such as those on acquisition concentrates on the hands of controllers of top groups of corporations while the direct bidders, who stay on lower tiers, are only tools for execution.
出处
《管理世界》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第3期122-129,共8页
Journal of Management World
