摘要
用委托代理模型来分析竞业禁止协议,说明了对掌握信息不同的核心雇员应采取不同的激励措施,对掌握信息多的雇员以惩罚的威胁为主,对掌握信息少的雇员以经济补偿为主,最优竞业禁止协议应体现出这一点。通过对竞业禁止协议的实施难度和对雇员流动方向的影响,得出一个结论:不同的法律环境对小企业的发展有不同的影响。
There are more legal wars hetween firms and its former employees about covenants not to compete in recent years. This paper tries to analyze covenants not to compete by a principal-agent modal, and account for that the optimal covenant should have different incentive to employees with different information, punishment or compensation.This paper also consider the implement of corenants and the flow of employees, we can get the condusion： different enviroment of law has different influnce on development of small-sized enterprises.
出处
《哈尔滨商业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2007年第2期117-121,共5页
Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition
关键词
竞业禁止协议
委托代理
惩罚
补偿
Covenants not to compete, Principal-agent, punishment
compensation
