摘要
我国特殊的股权结构决定了我国上市公司的主要代理问题是大股东与中小股东之间的代理冲突。大股东往往通过各种方式如资金占用等来对上市公司进行掠夺。在西方成熟的资本市场上,审计作为一种独立的外部监督机制能够在一定程度上抑制代理冲突。那么在我国新兴的市场中,审计能否起到有效的监督作用从而抑制大股东的"利益输送行为"呢?本文从需求和供给两个方面进行了研究。实证结果发现,从需求方面来说,大股东资金占用越严重的公司越没有动机聘请高质量的审计师;从供给方面来说,审计师在出具审计报告时会考虑大股东的资金占用,大股东资金占用越严重,越有可能被出具非标准的审计意见报告。实证结果表明我国目前还不存在高质量的审计需求,但审计师能对大股东的资金占用作出反应,从而在一定程度上抑制大股东的行为。
In our country,the special corporate ownership has created agency conflicts between controlling owners and minority shareholders.Controlling owners often tunnel listed companies through many kinds of ways,such as embezzling funds of listed companies.In west developed capital market,auditors could be employed as monitors and as bonding mechanisms to alleviate agency conflicts.Thus,can auditors could be employed as monitors to alleviate agency problem between controlling owners and minority shareholders in our country？This article studies the problem in view of supply and demand of external auditors.We find that firms are less to employ high quality auditors when they are subject to the agency problem embedded in their embezzlement of listed company＇s funds.In addition,auditor will more likely set a ‘not clean’ audit opinion.
出处
《中大管理研究》
2006年第1期120-143,共24页
China Management Studies
关键词
资金占用
审计需求
审计意见
embezzlement of funds,demand of external auditor,audit opinion
