摘要
本文以2002～2004年2238家上市公司为样本,按照最终控制人性质,将样本公司分为国有和民营金字塔控制两种主要类别,研究了代理问题在哪些公司较为严重,法律对于投资者保护是否能起到有效的治理作用。研究结果表明,国有和民营上市公司价值并无显著差异;随着政府层级的提升,国有控制公司价值提高;民营金字塔控制公司最终控制人所有权与控制权的分离对公司价值有负向作用;法治水平高的地区,其所属公司价值较高;海外上市提高了民营公司价值,但对国有公司的作用不显著;证券监管机构发挥的作用尚存不足。
We classify the ultimate controller of China＇ s listed companies into two major kinds, which are state controller and private pyramidal controller, for the purpose of studying agency issue and effectiveness of law in investor protection. We fred that there is no significant difference in corporate value for state-owned and privateowned companies. Companies controlled by higher-ranking govemment have higher corporate value. As private pyramidal control companies, the separation between ownership and right of control has negative influence on corporate value. Regions with a higher level of legality possess greater corporate value; Overseas listings help private companies enhance corporate value, but not as much for SOEs. The regional securities regulators need to strengthen their role.
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第3期18-25,共8页
Securities Market Herald
关键词
代理问题
公司治理
投资者保护
公司价值
agency issue
corporate governance
investor protection
corporate value
