摘要
农机造假是一个严重的社会经济问题。本文从博弈论和制度经济学角度,探讨了农机打假领域中政府与农机打假部门之间的委托-代理、农机打假部门与农机造假者之间的管制-被管制的博弈关系,并相应构建了两个博弈模型。根据博弈模型的均衡解,着重分析了政府监督成本、农机打假寻租概率、农机造假概率的构成因素以及三者之间的相互作用。最后,提出了政府治理农机造假的策略建议。
In our agricultural machinery, there is a serious social and economical problem which is machinery forging. Based on game theory and institutional economics, counterfeit and inferior agricultural machinery goods are discussed in the paper. The relationship of principal-agent between government and department for fighting against agricultural machinery forgers and of controlling - controlled between the department and agricultural machinery forgers in the game are analyzed respectively. Accordingly, two game models are established. As an emphasis, the structure and mutual effect of the three sides, such as supervising cost of government, rent-seeking probability of the department and probability of forging are analyzed by game equilibrium solutions. In the end, some suggestions for government are put forwarded.
出处
《中国农机化》
2007年第1期22-25,共4页
Chinese Agricul Tural Mechanization
关键词
农机打假
委托-代理
寻租
动态博弈
fighting against agricultural machinery forgers
principal-agent
rent-seeking
dynamic game
