摘要
文章基于不完全契约理论分析框架,利用拓展和延伸了的不完全契约理论模型,在分析归纳已有研究的基础上,引入私下执行资本(PEC),并进一步深入到自我执行机制的内在因素和作用机理。模型分析结果表明,正是重复博弈下的未来收益、声誉溢出和诱因底线等因素影响了PEC,进而影响企业间交易效率。分析有利于我们更好地理解上下游企业间交易行为乃至更广泛的企业关系,对于解释和改善我国企业目前管理现状提供了一定的思路。
Recur to the analysis framework of incomplete contract, this paper develops and extends incomplete theory model, bases on the existed research, introduces private enforcement capital （PEC）, and goes into the internal factors and acting mechanisms of self- enforcement. Results from model analysis show that, the future benefit of repeated game, reputation spill - over effect, and inducement affect PEC, then affect corporafional transaction efficiency. The analysis is useful for understanding inter- corporation behavior and even more extensive, also provides a way to explain and improve Chinese eorporafional management.
出处
《财经科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第3期82-89,共8页
Finance & Economics
