摘要
声誉本质是一种隐性契约,它传递了行为主体的行为偏好的信息,这种信息对博弈参与人的策略选择有导向作用,产生声誉效应。由于信息不对称,中央政府不能确定地方政府行为的真实动机,地方政府就有违规圈占耕地等机会主义倾向。基于声誉效应理论,文章认为中央政府声誉影响着地方政府行为选择,中央政府声誉越高,地方政府的机会主义行为就会越少,从而土地监控的效果就会越好。
Reputation is virtually implicit contract, and it may pass the information of an actor＇preference, which will affect the player＇ derision and bring reputation effect. Being asymmetric information, the central government can not confirm the local govemment＇true motivation, and the latter will have the incentives for opportunistic proneness to impropriate the land. Based on the theory of reputation effect, the central government＇reputation will guide the local government＇selection. The higher the former＇s reputation is, the less the latter＇s opportunistic behavior will be, and the better the supervision effect on the land may be.
出处
《华东经济管理》
2006年第12期24-27,共4页
East China Economic Management
关键词
政府声誉
声誉效应
土地监控
government reputation
reputation effect
supervision on land
