摘要
通过对兴业房产的案例分析,我们发现其公司控制权市场机制表现出了与西方主流理论和国内普遍研究结论截然不同的特征。在外部,公司股权的全流通与分散性没有引发更多的市场接管行为;在内部,代理权结构表现出了异乎寻常的超稳定性特征,且持股比例相近的股东对大股东的监督机制也归于失效。在公司控制权市场双向失灵的状态下,公司股票的全流通条件使公司遭遇了另一种“流动性”风险。该案例为我们探索有中国特色的公司治理机制提供了若干思考和启示。
Through the case study of Shanghai Xingye House Property Limited Company, we have found that the mechanism of markets for company-controlling right has shown characteristics that are completely different from those described by Western mainstream theories and by China's popular conclusions. Externally, the full floating and decentralization of company stockownership have not activated more behavior of taking charge of markets; internally, the structure of proxy has demonstrated the characteristics of unordinary super steadiness, and the supervisory system by which ordinary shareholders holding a close proportion of shares oversee big shareholders has ceased to be effective. When the market for company-controlling right does not function normally in two directions, the condition of full floating of company shares has caused companies to face another risk of 'fluidity'. This case will offer some thoughts and enlightenments to the exploration into the mechanism, with China's characteristics, of controlling companies.
出处
《管理世界》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第10期114-127,共14页
Journal of Management World
