摘要
股权分置改革之前,独立董事制度在中国公司治理中发挥的作用并不理想,原因是多方面的。在后股权分置,完善独立董事制度有了新机遇。独立董事制度本身的不完善给公司治理带来的新的代理问题值得关注,委托代理理论以激励相容来解决该问题。独立董事制度中独立性变量的引入,使得独立董事制度的激励设计不同于激励经理人。除了固定薪金的激励外,声誉激励在独立董事制度中的应用显得格外重要,而独立董事行业协会制度的建立保证了声誉激励的实施。
The cause which independent director system takes low effects in China corporation governance is various in ex - equity division. There is opportunity to improve independent director in post - equity division. We notice especially new agency problems which the faultiness of independent director system brings in corpo- ration governance. Principle -agency theory solves this problem by incentive compatibility. Independent di- rector＇s special status -i. e. independence variable induct -does not get independent director incentive designing the same as managers. This paper puts out that besides fixed salary, we attach importance to reputation incentive in independent director system, and which we establish independent director trades society which assure reputation incentive.
出处
《财经问题研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第9期51-56,共6页
Research On Financial and Economic Issues
关键词
独立董事
独立性
声誉激励
行业协会
independent director system
independence
reputation incentive
trades society
