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国有企业激励性报酬的分配机制 被引量:3

Distribution Mechanism of Incentive Compensation in State-Owned Enterprise
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摘要 以经济学和管理学理论为基础,研究了国有企业高层管理者的剩余分享机制和中低层员工的绩效工资分配机制.一方面,借鉴博弈论思想,运用定量方法确定高层管理者合理的剩余分享比例,选择基于高层管理者自身经营能力而获得的经济增加值(F)作为剩余分享的业绩基础;另一方面,为调动中低层员工的工作积极性,研究了中低层员工绩效工资分配机制,建立“企业整体—部门—员工个人”的绩效工资分配流程,并设计企业整体、各部门和员工个人的绩效工资计量模型. Based on the theories of economies and management, the surplus sharing mechanism for managers and performance payment distribution mechanism for staffers in a state-owned enterprise are studied. In view of game theory, some quantitative methods are applied to determine the rational proportion of surplus sharing, depending on the economic value added to the enterprise by each and every manager's individual ability as his/her performance standard. On the other hand, a distribution mechanism of performance payment for staffers is proposed through the distribution flow starting from the whole company to every department then to individual staffers with some measuring models designed correspondingly.
出处 《东北大学学报(自然科学版)》 EI CAS CSCD 北大核心 2006年第9期1050-1053,共4页 Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)
基金 国家科技攻关项目(2001BA206A-4)
关键词 剩余分享机制 绩效工资 国有企业 高层管理者 激励性报酬 中低层员工 surplus distribution mechanism pay for performance state-owned enterprise manager incentive compensation staffer
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