摘要
无论是出资者为主导的治理模式还是利益相关者治理模式,出资者治理在公司治理体系中均处于核心地位。企业原始契约具有不完备性决定了出资者与经营者之间的代理契约冲突,这是出资者财务治理和控制的逻辑起点。财务控制实质是以所有权为基础的契约安排,是对企业原始契约的不完备性进行边际修正,其适度性取决于出资者与理财者的博弈结果。出资者“硬”治理的财务控制的功效是有限的,引进出资者“软”治理是其优化的途径。
Whether investors＇ behalf -oriented governance model or stake-holders＇ behalf- oriented governance model, the core of corporation governance is investors＇ governance. The finns＇ initial contract is incomplete, so the conflict between investors and managers is inevitable. That is the logical starting pointing of investors＇ financial governance and control. Financial control is a kind of contract on the ownership of a finn, which amends the above incompleteness. The moderateness of financial control depends on the game between investors and financial managers. In order to overcome the limitation of function of hard-governance C financial control） and optimize it, it is essential to adopt soft-governance, which is to construct an incentive system and allow part of residual claims to financial managers.
出处
《审计与经济研究》
北大核心
2006年第4期47-51,共5页
Journal of Audit & Economics
关键词
出资者
理财者
财务治理
财务控制
investors
financial managers
financial governance
financial control
