摘要
文章基于信息经济学理论构建委托代理模型,研究我国上市公司资金闲置问题,并引入声誉因素对模型进行动态博弈分析。研究结果表明:短期激励机制条件下,投资不足、过度投资与资金闲置现象可以在公司内并存;声誉与对经理人激励的长期有效性,是解决投资不足、过度投资与资金闲置并存问题的关键;法律机制的完善与信息的公开,也有助于资金闲置问题的解决。
Based on the model of principal - agent of information economics, this paper studied the phenomenon of leave unused capital of china＇ s listed enterprises. After adding the reputation - factor, the paper analyzed the model by dynamic game theory . We show ： （ 1 ） under the situation of the short - time incentive mechanism, the short - investment, over - investment and leave unused capital can exist simultaneously in one company; （2） reputation can have the validity in a long - time incentive mechanism to managers, which is the key of settling the problem of the simultaneous existing of the short - investment , over- investment and leave unused capital in one company; （3） perfecting the law mechanism and the information opening mechanism can also be helpful for the settlement of problem of leave unused capital.
出处
《商业经济与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第7期66-70,共5页
Journal of Business Economics
关键词
信息不对称
委托代理模型
声誉
资金闲置
asymmetry of information
the model of principal - agent
reputation
leave unused capital
