期刊文献+

执法者的理性自利对消费者福利目标的异化——以美国司法部和FTC执行反垄断法为线索的历史考察

Dissimilation on the Goal of the Consumer Welfare from Public Prosecutors' Rational Behaviors——A historical review on DOJ and FTC's enforcement activities
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摘要 保护和实现消费者福利的最大化是反垄断立法与执法的根本目标所在。但由于公共执行机构出于自利动机,运用反垄断法进行利益寻租,致使反垄断法的执行结果严重偏离了其公益初衷,导致了对消费者福利目标的异化。只有明了执行机构在从事反垄断公务活动中同时追求自身利益,才有可能对此进行限制并相应地改革反垄断执法机构。 The essential goal of the antitrust legislation and enforcement is protecting and achieving consumer welfare. However, the antitrust bureaucracy managed antitrust laws as a tool for rent-seeking because of the public prosecutors' private incentives. It led to the actual enforcement effects departing from public interest, dissimilating from the goal of consumer welfare. The public law enforcement agencies were pursuing their own interests while they implemented public decisions. Therefore, the enforcement bureaus require some constraints and effective reform.
作者 吴玉岭
出处 《广东商学院学报》 2006年第3期92-96,共5页 Journal of Guangdong University of Business Studies
关键词 消费者福利 反垄断法 执行机构 consumer welfare antitrust law enforcement agencies
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参考文献15

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共引文献16

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