摘要
针对我国接连发生矿难而矿主们却很少购买保险的问题,需要以信息经济学为理论依据,从逆向选择和道德风险两个角度分析原因,并在此基础上用数理经济模型分析矿主在保险过程中的行为对保险需求的影响,从而提出振兴保险业的建议。这些对保险业的健康发展无疑是有着重要的现实意义的。
This paper aims at the problem of coal mine disasters happening frequently but coal mine owners seldom buying insurance, bases the theory of information economics, and analyzes the masons of low - level insurance demand in mine disaster from the angle of adverse selection and moral hazard , and then explains what effects the mine owners＇ actions having on insurance demand in the course of insurance with mathematical economic model. At last bring forward some advices to develop insurance , which are significant for the continuable development of our country＇ s insurance.
出处
《哈尔滨商业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2006年第3期50-53,共4页
Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition
关键词
矿难保险需求
信息不对称
逆向选择
道德风险
数理经济分析
insurance demand in mine disaster
asymmetric information
adverse selection
moral hazard
mathematical economic analysis
