摘要
审计委员会制度建设表面上的繁荣与实质上的治理弱化,是当前我国上市公司治理改革中亟待解决的一个新问题。我们在解释我国审计委员会治理弱化制度成因的基础上,借助一个简单的博弈分析框架,提出通过激励约束机制的实施,即加大对审计委员会“不尽职”的惩罚力度,可以降低上市公司内部控制人“侵占”的概率,从而在一定程度上解决内部控制人与股东等利益相关者之间的代理问题。
It is an important new problem for governance reform of Chinese listed companies that audit committee makes a phenomenally good construction while naturally being poor as to its governance performance.This paper firstly interprets the institutional causality of the poor governance performance of audit committee. By using a simple game analysis, it concludes that it helps to solute or alleviate the agency problem between inside controls and outside investors to some extent when increasing the penalty level for the ＂non- duty＂ behavior of audit committee, which means practicing the mechanism of incentives and constraints.
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
2006年第2期137-140,共4页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(批准号:70172010)
关键词
审计委员会
公司治理
内部控制人
audit committee
governance performance
inside controlers
