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基于讨价还价模型的供应链博弈分析 被引量:1

Game Analysis on the Basis of Bargaining Model in the Supply Chain
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摘要 供应链节点企业的竞争冲突、利益分配,一直是供应链管理的核心问题。因此,收益如何在供应链内进行分配关系到供应链的稳定性,收益的合理分配是各节点企业积极合作的保证。本文运用博弈论基本原理,论证了讨价还价模型在供应链中应用的可行性,为供应链节点企业的决策提供依据。 The competition conflicts and distribution of interests of nodal enterprises of the supply chain have been the core of the supply chain management all the times. How the income is assigned concerns the stability of the supply chain, and the reasonable distribution of the income is the assurance of every nodal enterprise positive cooperation. This paper uses the basic principle of the game theory, proves the feasibility that the bargaining model is used in the supply chain, and offers the basis on which nodal enterprises of the supply chain make decision.
出处 《小型内燃机与摩托车》 CAS 北大核心 2006年第2期56-58,共3页 Small Internal Combustion Engine and Motorcycle
基金 四川省应用基础项目(03JY029-024)
关键词 供应链 博弈论 NASH均衡 讨价还价模型 Supply chain, Game theory, Nash equilibrium, Bargaining model
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