摘要
为了研究当产出可以观测时,企业员工素质信息是完全信息与非对称信息的条件下,企业员工最优退出机制,建立了两个企业裁员模型.在模型中,企业和员工都是风险中性的,企业是委托人,员工是代理人,采用利润分享模式和绩效原则,以企业利润为目标,留用概率和员工分离补偿为特征.根据显示原理,采用最优化理论求解模型.对比有无利润分享模式下的裁员机制,再对裁员机制中所涉及相关参数进行比较静态分析.研究表明:企业存在最佳裁员规模,对退出的员工应按不同素质类型支付最低补偿金;利润分享模式会降低补偿金,但对信息租金无影响;非对称信息会导致企业扩大裁员规模与支付信息租金,信息不对称程度越强,信息租金越大.
in order to study the optimal mechanism for layoff employees in enterprise when the employees＇ output is observable and the employees＇ abilities are in complete information or in asymmetry informarion, this paper sets up two layoff models. In these models, both owner and employees are risk-neutral, and the owner is the principal and the employees are the agents. Based on the mode of profit share and the performance principle and the object of the enterprise, the models contain layoff probability and severance pay. Following the revelation principle, we solve the models by using the optimization theory. Two layoff mechanisms with or without the mode of profit share have been compared. Then the relative parameters involved in the layoff mechanisms have been discussed by the comparative statics. The researeh shows that the optimal layoff scales exist in enterprise and the lowest compensation should be paid according to the ability types of layoff employees. The mode of profit share can reduce the compensation, which is irrelevant to the information rent. The asymmetry information could enlarge the layoff scale and the information rent. The higher the asymmetric degree is, the larger the information rent is.
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第1期62-67,共6页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
教育部高校博士点基金资助项目(20020611009)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(02JA790062)
关键词
利润分享
信息结构
裁员模型
机制设计
profit share
information structure
layoff model
mechanism design
