摘要
为解决独立董事的激励机制,采用数学分析的方法,设计了不对称信息条件下独立董事的最优激励合约,求出了独立董事最优激励系数,讨论了最优激励强度的影响因素.结果表明:独立董事的能力、努力成本、风险厌恶程度等,影响独立董事的激励合约.
The incentive mechanism of the independent directors has not yet been solved. The optimal incentive contracts between stockholders and independent directors under asymmetric information conditions through mathematic analytic methods is analyzed. The incentive coefficient of an independent director is given and the factors influencing the incentive coefficient are discussed. Results show that the incentive contracts of the independent directors are affected by abilities, effort costs, the degree of risk aversion, etc. of the independent directors.
出处
《哈尔滨工业大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2005年第12期1711-1713,共3页
Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology
关键词
不对称信息
激励机制
独立董事
asymmetric information
incentive mechanism
independent director
