摘要
本文从资产结构的角度探讨资产流动性对财务危机重组的影响,建立了一个考虑资产流动性的财务危机模型。同时根据股东-经理人是否能与债权人协商及公司债务契约中有无优先偿债禁止条款,在不同情形下,分析了财务危机中各个请求权人因应策略和投资效率。本文研究表明,债权人会容忍某些程度的投资无效率以避免无谓的资产流动性损失;当债权人无法协商时,无论投资项目净现值为正或负,股东-经理人都将进行投资,使财务危机公司发生过度投资无效率问题;当债权人可协商时,虽然还是无法完全消除财务危机公司过度投资行为,但是可以改善上述问题。
This paper investigates the relationship between asset liquidity and investment efficiency of financially distressed firms. In the literatures, there have been lots of discussions on behavior of financially distressed firms when contracts restructuring and finances restructuring are available. This paper contributes to the literatures by taking into account asset liquidity and the probability of investment success to solve financial distress. Several interesting results are found. First, the owner- manager of a distressed firm will endure investment inefficiency in event of liquility loss. Second, overinvestment occurs if the owner- manager cannot negotiate with debtholders. Finally, the overinvestment problem is mitigated when the owner- manager can negotiate with debtholders.
出处
《数量经济技术经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第11期137-150,共14页
Journal of Quantitative & Technological Economics
关键词
财务危机重组
资产流动性
债务契约
Financial Distress Restructuring
Assets Liquidity
Debt Contract
