摘要
通过建立模型分析目标激励在委托代理中的作用,可以发现:在没有风险时,物质激励与目标激励效果相同.在存在风险的情况下,目标激励比纯粹物质激励更有效率,带来更多的总剩余,并且,即使在风险较高的情况下,也能保证委托代理关系的存在;当目标激励变为奉献激励时,会导致代理人不作为行为.因此,在无风险的情况下,对代理人应采用物质激励,在有风险的情况下,应对代理人采用目标激励.
In this paper, it discovers the roles of target incentive in agency by model. The solutions are as follows： under no risk, material incentive has the same effects on a deputy with target incentive; in the risk, target incentive is more efficiency than material incentive in agency and comes to larger total surplus, and even if in the higher risk, target incentive can guarantee agency to continue; when target incentive is changed into dedication incentive, it makes a deputy to do nothing. So, under no risk, material incentive should be adopted to a deputy in the company; and in the risk, target incentive should be adopted in the company.
出处
《北京工商大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
2005年第6期51-54,共4页
Journal of Beijing Technology and Business University:Natural Science Edition
关键词
目标激励
物质激励
委托代理
target incentive
material incentive
agency
