摘要
在考虑声誉的情形下,探讨了风险投资知识转移激励约束机制的内在机理.建立多期博弈模型,分析表明:在风险投资家与风险企业家之间、风险企业内部成员之间,知识传递者进行知识转移的努力程度与其在知识产出中的分享成正比;知识传递者的声誉、知识产出系数的提高,有利于推动知识转移;而知识转化的成本的增加,则不利于知识的转移.在管理者参与型的知识转移过程中,风险企业家提供的额外奖励可以有效地促进员工之间知识交流的积极性;风险企业内部知识传授者的知识存量与企业价值增长相关系数越大,则其收益分享比例与努力程度也越高.
On the basis of reputation concerns, the inner mechanism for knowledge-transferred incentive in venture capital investment was discussed. According to multi-stage game model, it was shown that between venture capitalist and venture entrepreneur or among venture enterprise, the diligent degree of knowledge carrier was proportional to sharing proportion in the knowledge output; the reputation of knowledge carriers and the improvement of knowledge output coefficient, leading to promote knowledge transaction. And the increasing cost of knowledge transformation was unfavorable to the knowledge transaction. The entrepreneur could improve the enthusiasm of knowledge shifting among the interior employees in enterprise effectively by offering the appropriate extra reward. The increase of the correlation coefficient between knowledge carrier and enterprise＇s value-increase would improve the sharing proportion and the diligent degree of knowledge carrier.
出处
《华中科技大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2005年第11期108-110,共3页
Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Natural Science Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(10271025)
关键词
风险投资
知识转移
激励约束
声誉
venture capital
knowledge transfer
incentive mechanism
reputation
