摘要
审计合谋行为指审计机构屈服于客户压力对已经发现的错误或缺陷不作为的行为,本质上是一种市场间的博弈行为。AM机制指审计市场的职业道德甄别机制。在不讲信誉的市场环境中,容易发生审计合谋行为;在讲信誉的市场中,AM机制将遏制合谋行为的发生。通过建立相应的外部审计代理模型,对审计“合谋”行为进行了深入的理论分析,发现短期利益是驱使审计机构参与合谋的原因,只有在讲信誉的市场,审计机构才会有长远的眼光。
Audit collusion is a behavior of market game, subjecting to client pressure to neglect the faults found. AM is the abbreviation of audit market screening mechanism for professional ethics. In a market without credit, more audit collusion will happen; but in a market with credit, collusion will be checked through AM. This article analyses the mechanism of audit collusion by the combination of AM theory and the theory of Principal-Agent.
出处
《东华大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2005年第5期35-39,共5页
Journal of Donghua University(Natural Science)
