摘要
A model to explain the dynamic characters of earnings management was developed based on the interactionamong several firms’ disclosure policies. Under the condition of incomplete information, each firm’s earnings man-agement will be influenced by the earnings disclosure policies of other firms. It can lead to "herd behavior" of earningsmanagement. This paper studies the relationship between earnings manipulation and rights issue policy based on thedistribution of earnings after management. The results indicate that Chinese listed companies trend towards controllingROE in the narrow ranges just above 6% and 10% .Therefore, "herd behavior" exists in the earnings management.
A model to explain the dynamic characters of earnings management was developed based on the interaction among several firms＇ disclosure policies. Under the condition of incomplete information, each firm＇s earnings management will be influenced by the earnings disclosure policies of other firms. It can lead to “herd behavior” of earnings management. This paper studies the relationship between earnings manipulation and rights issue policy based on the distribution of earnings after management. The results indicate that Chinese listed companies trend towards controlling ROE in the narrow ranges just above 6% and 10% .Therefore, “herd behavior” exists in the earnings management.
