摘要
运用公共经济学中中央政府与地方职能划分的原则、土地竞租原理和产权经济学理论,分析了退耕还林中地方政府和农民承担的成本和收益损失。认为中央政府在退耕还林中忽视了地方政府的利益需求,不仅对地方政府在退耕还林中的生态贡献补偿不足,而且加重了地方政府的工作负担和财政负担,对地方政府缺乏激励;对农民的补偿较之于其在退耕还林中承担的直接成本、间接成本和林业经营的巨大风险,现有补偿数量不足,时间短;林地承包经营权限制性强、缺乏可交易性又使产权激励功能弱化。退耕还林要实现“退得下、稳得住、不返弹”的目标,必须加大对退耕还林地区地方政府和农民补偿额度,并建立长期、稳定、合理的生态补偿机制。
The theory of public economics, land contesting - hire and property right are employed to research on the cost and income loss suffered by the l^al government and the farmer in the de-farming and reforestation Program （DFRP）. The article points out that the central governrrent ignores the interests of the local government, not only by compensating instufficiently for its ecological contribution, lint also by aggravating its work and financial burden. Compared with the direct cost, indirect cost and the enormous risk of forest management, the compensation for farmes is deficient and the period of compesnsation is too short. Because of strong restriction and without alienation, the encouragement function of the contracted land management right is weakened. In order to realize the target of the eeo-environment DFR policy, the central government must not only enlarges the scale of compensation for the local government and farmers in the DFR area, but also create a long-term, steady,and rational eco-compensation mechanism.
出处
《中国人口·资源与环境》
CSSCI
2005年第5期104-107,共4页
China Population,Resources and Environment
基金
国家哲学社会科学基金项目"西部地区生态建设补偿机制
配套政策和评价体系研究"(04CJY006)部分研究成果
关键词
退耕还林
地方政府
农民
制度缺陷
de-fanning and reforestation
local government
farmer
institutional defects
