摘要
在危机管理和冲突分析中,力量对等冲突方之间的相互威慑是否具有稳定性问题,一直存在疑义。本文基于进化博弈论视野,给出了直接求解3×3和4×4鹰—鸽博弈扩展模型进化稳定策略ESS(EvolutionaryStableStrategy)的方法,画出了3×3鹰—鸽扩展博弈的相位图,得出了威慑策略是进化稳定策略的结论,从而对上述问题进行了有说服力的解释。
In crisis management and conflict analysis, it is an unsolved problem whether pairwise mutual deterrence has stability. From the perspective of evolutionary game, this paper gives the direct approach for Evolutionary Stable Strategy of 3 × 3 and 4 × 4 hawk-dove game extension models, provides the phase portraits of 3 × 3 hawk-dove extension game, and concludes that deterrence strategies are ESSs. The conclusion is a persuasive explanation for the problem.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSCD
2005年第4期1-6,共6页
Operations Research and Management Science
关键词
危机管理
威慑理论
进化博弈
稳定策略
crisis management
deterrence theory
evolutionary game
stable strategy
